Blockchain has received great attention in recent years and motivated innovations in different scenarios. However, many vital issues which affect its performance are still open. For example, it is widely convinced that high level of security and scalability and full decentralization are still impossible to achieve simultaneously. In this paper, we propose Bicomp, a bilayer scalable Nakamoto consensus protocol, which is an approach based on high security and pure decentralized Nakamoto consensus, and with a significant improvement on scalability. In Bicomp, two kinds of blocks are generated, i.e., microblocks for concurrent transaction packaging in network, and macroblocks for leadership competition and chain formation. A leader is elected at beginning of each round by using a macroblock header from proof-of-work. An elected leader then receives and packages multiple microblocks mined by different nodes into one macroblock during its tenure, which results in a bilayer block structure. Such design limits a leader's power and encourages as many nodes as possible to participate in the process of packaging transactions, which promotes the sharding nature of the system. Furthermore, several mechanisms are carefully designed to reduce transaction overlapping and further limit a leader's power, among which a novel transaction diversity based metric is proposed as the second level criteria besides the longest-chain-first principle on selecting a legitimate chain when fork happens. Security issues and potential attacks to Bicomp are extensively discussed and experiments for evaluation are performed. From the experimental results based on 50 nodes all over the world, Bicomp achieves significant improvement on scalability than that of Bitcoin and Ethereum, while the security and decentralization merits are still preserved.
Introduction
Blockchain has received great attention from both industry and academia along with the boom of cryptocurrencies in recent 1 The work in this article was supported partially by the NSF of China under Grant Nos. 61501125 and 61502018.
years. It first appears as the foundation of the famous cryptocurrency Bitcoin [1] and now has evolved to a computing platform that enables decentralized, persistent, anonymous, and auditable transaction recording at Internet scale. Although blockchain has already motivated many innovations [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , it still faces several obstacles which hinder its widely deployment. A famous problem is the so-called Impossible Trinity, which means a blockchain system cannot simultaneously achieve the following three characteristics: high scalability, high security, and full decentralization.
Specifically, in a blockchain platform, transactions are recorded by an ordered list of blocks (i.e., a blockchain). Each node in the system competes for the right of generating new blocks and the associated rewards. The process of competing and achieving a network-wide agreement among all participants called a consensus process. The consensus protocol of the first blockchain system, i.e., Bitcoin, is often mentioned as Nakamoto consensus. In Nakamoto consensus, each node is required to solve a computationally difficult problem for obtaining the right to generate a block, which is called Proof-of-Work (PoW). PoW has good anti-attack performance in open network environments and it's the only one algorithm whose security has been verified for almost ten years in the real world with millions of real users. However, its associated resource consumption is huge and its scalability is poor.
Recent emerged algorithms often aim at addressing the scalability issue by sacrificing some degree of decentralization. In this category, a famous protocol is Proof-of-Stake (PoS). The main idea behind PoS is simple: the probability to create a block and obtain the associated reward is proportional to a node's owned stake in the system. PoS is based on an assumption that users hold more stakes would be less likely to compromise the system. PoS can achieve high scalability, which attracts many systems. For example, Ethereum [14] claims to switch from PoW to PoS in the near future. However, PoS may apparently lead to centralization to a small number of users with more stakes. Similarly, Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), which is a variation of PoS and utilized by Enterprise Operation System (EOS) [15] , also sacrifices the fairness for scalability and thus leads to power centralization to several users, e.g., 21 super nodes in EOS.
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Specifically, f th the same par nsensus, which opagation latenc haved nodes fi result, all transactions appearing only in the replaced block(s) become invalid and have to be re-submitted. It is apparent that the more branches appear, the more computational power will be wasted and the longer time for confirming a transaction will be consumed. Therefore, the block size in Bitcoin has to be limited to 1 MB, since a larger block size may increase the propagation delay and thus the probability of fork. Similarly, block interval is set to about ten minutes for preventing more blocks to be generated before the previous one has been propagated throughout the network. Such limitations in turn results in an upper bound on the number of TPS, i.e., an average of 7 TPS.
Bitcoin-NG [16] : Bitcoin-NG is the first work that divides the block generation process into two separate phases: 1) leader election, and 2) transaction packaging. To achieve this, Bitcoin-NG proposes two different block types: Keyblocks are generated through mining with PoW and are used to securely elect leaders, at a moderate frequency, such as every 10 minutes as in Bitcoin. Microblocks contain transactions, which are generated by elected leader without PoW computation. Microblocks can be produced continuously between the mining of two keyblocks, which increases the throughput. Bitcoin-NG's decoupling of keyblocks from microblocks is an important idea that motivates much research work in this area. However, a leader in Bitcoin-NG has enough power to hurt the system, i.e., a leader in his epoch can intentionally forge or rewrite history and invalidate transactions without any cost, which make Bitcoin-NG to be vulnerable to selfish or malicious manners. Moreover, since all transactions must be received by the leader, this may result in extra latency or omission of receiving remote transactions at the leader and thus affects the throughput.
ByzCoin [17] : ByzCoin is a novel Byzantine consensus protocol that achieves Byzantine consensus while preserving Bitcoin's open membership by dynamically forming hash powerproportionate consensus committee. Such a committee replaces the single leader in Bitcoin-NG, which is the key improvement of ByzCoin for maintaining the security of the system. In ByzCoin, when a node solves the hash puzzle of PoW, it can then become a member of the current consensus committee and has the power to vote for microblocks by using a modified PBFT algorithm. ByzCoin organizes the consensus committee into a communication tree where the most recent miner (the committee leader) is at the root. The committee leader runs PBFT to get all members to agree on the next block and it replaces PBFT's O(n 2 ) MAC-authenticated all-to-all communication with a primitive called scalable collective signing (CoSi) [22] that reduces messaging complexity to O(n). However, in ByzCoin, a malicious committee leader can potentially reject transactions by not proposing them or exclude nodes from the consensus process, which will hurt the safety and fairness. Furthermore, since a new microblock in ByzCoin must cite the previous one, its throughput is largely decreased due to the loss of parallelism.
Conflux [19] : The key novelty of Conflux is it allows multiple participants to contribute to the Conflux blockchain concurrently while still keeping safety of the chain. In Conflux, when a node generates a new block by PoW, it identifies a predecessor as the parent block for the new block and creates a parent edge between these two blocks. To incorporate contributions from concurrent blocks, the node also identifies all other blocks that have no incoming edge and creates reference edges from the new block to those blocks. Such reference edges represent that those blocks are generated before the new block. As a result, the edges between blocks form a direct acyclic graph rather than a chain. To determine the order of the concurrently generated blocks, Conflux establishes a pivot chain that starts from the genesis block and contains only parent edges. Further, all blocks in the direct acyclic graph are divided into epochs using the pivot chain. However, Conflux is built on an assumption that transactions in concurrent blocks will never conflict with each other and therefore cannot be used in open network environments with potential adversaries. Furthermore, similar to other DAG based systems such as IOTA [23] , the incentive strategy of Conflux is not designed. Due to the openness and arbitrariness of the generation of blocks in DAG based protocols, how to achieve safe and fair incentive is still an open issue in this area.
Bicomp: A Bilayer Scalable Nakamoto Consensus based Protocol
In this section, we propose Bicomp, a bilayer scalable Nakamoto consensus protocol. We first introduce the system model. Next, we provide the design of Bicomp.
System Model
Bicomp is designed for open and untrustworthy networks wherein nodes may delay, drop, re-order or duplicate messages arbitrarily. A subset of system participants may be Byzantine nodes and controlled by a malicious attacker. The other nodes are honest and abide by the predefined protocol. In this paper, we assume that the total hash power of all malicious nodes is less than 1/4 of the system's total hash power at any time, since the PoW based systems are vulnerable to selfish mining attacks by adversary who controlled more than 1/4 hash power of the network [24] . Network nodes in the system are connected by reliable peer-to-peer connections. Each node can generate keypairs but there is no trusted public key infrastructure. In addition, we assume that each node's computational power in the network is within a certain range and no one is far better than others.
Overview
In this section, we first provide an overview to Bicomp. Bicomp divides the block generation process into two phases, i.e., leader election and transaction packaging, which is similar as Bitcoin-NG and ByzCoin. However, in Bicomp, PoW based computation are needed in both phases. To be specific, Bicomp employs two kinds of block, namely macroblock and microblock. The macroblocks form the main chain and each of them links to the previous one chronologically. Macroblock consists of a header and a body. The macroblock header is used to compete for leadership of the next round for macroblock generation. Consequently, less time will be consumed for spreading it throughout the network, comparing with the 1 MB block of Bitcoin and 2KB block of Ethereum. When a node receives a header, it will stop competing for leadership and wait for the incoming macroblock, by which the potential forks are suppressed.
Another instant a node may encounter a fork is when the node mines a macroblock header. In Bicomp, a node must refer to the last macroblock's hash value before it starts PoW based header mining. However, once a node receives a different chain from the one it maintains, even if it has successfully generated a macroblock header and becomes a leader, it will still give up its leadership and switches to the newly received chain when the latter one should be legitimate, in order to maintain the consistency of the blockchain.
Besides, there exists a key step before a node starts to mine a macroblock header. That is, a node should calculate, verify, and settle the transactions contained in the macroblock it wants to refer and also the associated fees and rewards. This is a key step which is helpful to guarantee the system security and avoid potential fraud of a leader. We will introduce this part and explain in detail in section 3.6.
Packaging Transactions in Microblocks
Microblock mining is the process that node packages transactions into microblocks it generates. Multiple nodes can mine microblock concurrently in Bicomp and most of their efforts will be reserved, which is very different from traditional PoW based mining where only one block will be reserved at last.
In Bicomp, after a leader is elected via the mining process of macroblock header, it will broadcast its header to others. Other nodes that received the header can start to mine a microblock if they verify the credibility of the information contained in the header. In general, the verification process includes: 1) Check the validity of information in header, such as height, timestamp, and especially the correctness and identity of the hash value of the referred previous macroblock; 2) Check the correctness of the settlement results of fees done by the header, by reviewing and recalculating the related transactions based on locally stored blocks and information. A node will accept the leadership of another node only when it has validated the correctness and legality of the macroblock header sent by that node. When a node accepted a leader, it then starts the microblock mining process and becomes a microblock miner.
A microblock miner selects transactions it has received and packages them as a Merkle tree [21] . In the Merkle tree, the leaf node stores the transaction content while the intermediate node stores the hash value of the content. The hash value at the tree root is inserted into the header of the microblock.
Different microblock miners may select the same transactions to package into their microblocks and thus lead to overlapping. To encourage microblock miners to select transactions with low possibility to be overlapped with the ones packaged by other miners, incentives are design that when a transaction is overlapped with its prior ones, it will be considered non-existent and its miners cannot get any reward. Therefore, each microblock miner is motivated to select transactions that avoid confliction with others. For example, a miner can leverage machine learning or game theory based localized methods, to determine a selected transaction set.
Furthermore, a networking based mechanism is leveraged by Bicomp to help reduce such overlapping. That is, in the underlying P2P network, a transaction is only relayed within limited hops. Such manner takes advantage of the sharding nature of network and reduces the possibility that the same transaction to be received by many different microblock miners.
PoW based computation is the last step to generate a microblock. The microblock miner continuously changes the nonce until the calculated hash value meets the difficulty requirement. Information including the chosen transactions are involved in calculation, which aims at increasing the fraud cost of a malicious miner. When a verifiable microblock is produced, the miner will then broadcast it in the network. Next, a miner can start to mine another microblock until it receives the macroblock generated by the leader of this round.
Macroblock Generation
Macroblock is generated by the elected leader at its tenure and will also ends his tenure when finished.
After a leader mines a macroblock header successfully as introduced in section 3.3, it waits and receives newly generated microblocks from other nodes. After verifying the microblocks, leader puts them into its caching pool. Each leader's tenure lasts for T minutes, which starts at the moment when that leader sends out its mined macroblock header, and ends at the time when it picks microblocks from the caching pool and packages them together to generate a macroblock. The leader signs the generated macroblock and broadcasts it to the network. In Bicomp, a leader always waits a fixed amount of time T before it starts to generate a macroblock, thus different numbers of microblocks may be received at different rounds. In general, two cases will exist as follows.
The first case is, when time T elapses, the microblocks received by the leader do not exceed a predefined capacity C. In this case, all these microblocks are adopted and encapsulated into the new macroblock, unless there is no transaction in a microblock that is not included in previous ones.
The second case is a leader receives more microblocks than it can accommodate, and it will pick some to package. For a nonmalicious node, it will always select the microblocks whose transactions inside has lower transaction overlapping number, so that not only the node obtains higher rewards by itself but the microblock achieves a higher probability for being chosen as part of the legitimate chain when chain forks, as we discussed above.
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Selfish mining
In a selfish-mining attack, attackers keep discovered blocks private and intentionally fork the chain. In Bicomp, selfish miners might either detain discovered macroblock headers or keep the constructed macroblocks private. While in Bicomp different macroblock containing the most non-overlapped transactions will be chosen as the legitimate one, selfish miners may have lower chance to develop a private branch contains more non-overlapped transactions than the public branch since keeping macroblock header private prohibits other nodes to mine microblocks on it. As a result, detaining a macroblock header will not be enough to perform a selfish mining attack.
Another choice is to retain the constructed macroblocks, which is similar as Bitcoin. Bicomp demands the leader to send out macroblocks at the end of its tenure, which implies that the selfish miner cannot always retain a macroblock, because this may cause other nodes to discard its leadership. Instead, in Bicomp, an attacker can choose to construct a macroblock in advance and keep it private until its tenure ends, so that it can mine the next macroblock header with a longer time than other nodes. This behavior is consistent with the analysis in literature [24] , so the conclusion therein also stands here. That is, adversary must control more than 1/4 hash power of the network to perform such attack. However, we should note that additional obstacles are set up by Bicomp, i.e., the above behavior will likely in turn make the hidden macroblock contain less non-overlapped transactions than normal public ones. This implies extra cost and risk to an attacker since if there exist multiple macroblocks in the network. In that case, the selfish mined ones are likely to be discarded by honest nodes.
Double-Spending
A double-spending attacker may first publish a transaction TX 1 . When he receives a service or a commodity from the seller, he publishes an alternative transaction TX 2 . In Bitcoin, blocks are infrequent and miners collect transactions until they form a block. Until that time, transaction TX 1 may be replaced by another transaction TX 2 without any cost. Therefore, according to an empirical conclusion, when a transaction is packaged into a block and follows by 6 new blocks later on a chain, that transaction can be considered to be confirmed. Furthermore, publication of conflicting transactions with different destinations is prohibited by standard Bitcoin software, which also warns the user of conflicting transactions propagating in the network [27] . In Bicomp, as introduced in section 3.5, each macroblock that contained transactions is referred to by the following macroblock on the blockchain. Therefore, to perform a double-spending attack, a node must have enough hash power to realize a selfish mining attack as follow.
A selfish attacker constructs two different macroblocks using the same header privately: M1 and M2. M1 contains less nonoverlapped transactions but has a poison transaction TX P . M2 contains more non-overlapped transactions but without TX P . The attacker first reveals M1 to public and privately mine on M2. In this situation, even if honest miners construct a new macroblock on M1, say M1', the private attacker can still use M2 and the selfish mined M2' to replace both M1 and M1' on the legitimate chain. Since M2 contains more non-overlapped transactions than M1, this may increase the possibility of success with such replacement. Such behavior can result in double-spending attacks. However, we should note that M2 is also a selfish mined block which may have low diversity compared to the public-mined one, i.e., M1'. Furthermore, to realize such attack, at least 1/4 hash power is required even in Bitcoin as introduced above. Due to the existence of multiple defensive mechanisms in Bicomp as introduced, it is intuitive that more hash power is required to perform such attack successfully in Bicomp. We leave the theoretical proof as a future work. Besides, a delay confirmation for transactions as done in the Bitcoin is also useful to avoid such attack in Bicomp.
Fork
Fork in Bitcoin or other PoW based protocols often happens due to the existence of packet propagation delay in network. That is, multiple blocks are generated after the same prefix since the miners fail to receive a previous generated block before they repeat the mining work. To solve this, Bitcoin limits the block size to 1 MB.
In contrast, Bicomp decreases the chance of such fork since a macroblock header will always come first before the generation of other kind of blocks. Therefore, microblock miners will always choose a header to follow before it starts to mine and wait for the incoming macroblocks. Recall that a header's size is only 200 bytes, so that it can be spread throughout the network very quickly and thus largely decrease the possibility of fork.
However, in a large network, Bicomp may still experience fork when multiple macroblock headers are generated after the same prefix of a macroblock due to the network delay. We claim that such fork is not purely harmful to our system. That is, as we have discussed, a branch with more computational power and high transaction diversity will be selected as the legitimate one, the existence of fork has the potential to curb the effects of Sybil attacks and selfish mining.
Single-Point Failure at Leader
In Bicomp, there exists only one leader who is allowed for mining a macroblock at one round. As a result, mechanisms should be designed to avoid single-point failure at leader and resist to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. In our design, each node who has accepted a macroblock header from a leader, will wait until it receives a valid macroblock or the end of that leader's tenure, whenever comes first. If a node never receives a valid macroblock from the current leader before its tenure ends, it will initiate the leader-election process based on the latest macroblock restored locally. Here, those headers, which were generated at the same time with the out-of-date one, can be reused and re-broadcasted immediately to the network. In terms of judging a leader's expiration locally, a node b should determine a waiting time E as follows: 
Throug
We first eva can achieve. F overlapped tran each microbloc packaging its m the upper boun reveal its imp intervals, i.e., 6 the macroblock In Fig. 5 
Block Siz
In Fig. 6 able wo-phase block generation process, i.e., leader election and transaction packaging. In the leader-election phase, PoW based computation is employed for generating a macroblock header to compete for leadership. In transaction packaging phase, any node except the leader can join the process and package transactions they received and generate microblocks, which compose the final macroblock. In Bicomp, a leader has no right to pack any transactions but only allowed to use microblocks from others to generate a macroblock, which forms a bilayer structure of blocks. By doing so, the leader's power is limited and other nodes are also encouraged to play significant roles in block generation process. Besides, incentives are also elaborately designed to motivate different participants. In general, Bicomp fairly decentralizes network power, utilizes the sharding nature of the network, increases the efficiency via concurrent packaging process, and reduces the long-distance transmission and flooding of numerous transactions in the network. Security analysis and evaluation for Bicomp are proposed, which shows better performance than Bitcoin and Ethereum in terms of the security and scalability.
